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Abstract 
In this paper, we show that, in 1961 and before he had read "The Problem of Social 
Cost", Calabresi reached exactly the same conclusions as the one reached by Coase and 
summarized by Stigler as the "Coase theorem" but he believed that this result was valid 
only in the theoretical world of the economists. We also analyze how Calabresi's thought 
evolved, in particular i ncluding transaction costs in his reasoning, but nonetheless 
remained faithful to his conclusions about the practical validity of the Coase theorem. 
Calabresi's conclusions remained ignored by economists and by most of legal scholars 
until the early 1970s. It was only when scholars started to emphasize the unrealistic 
assumptions upon which rest the Coase theorem that they also started to pay attention 
to Calabresi. His works were quoted and essentially used to emphasize the limits of the 
Coase theorem. Calabresi and Coase were then put on the same footing; the works of the 
former presented as more complete and more practical than the works of the later. 
Keywords: Calabresi, economic analysis of law, Coase theorem, invariance, problem of 
social cost. 
JEL classification: A12, B2, B31, K0. 
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1. Introduction 
"The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) and "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the 
Law of Torts" (1961), the two articles that "can be looked on as the beginning of Law and 
Economics as an independent, specialized field of intellectual inquiry" (Hirsh and 
Osborne, 1992, p. 521), were published (almost) fifty years ago2. Their authors, 
respectively Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi, are usually presented as (two of) the 
founding fathers of the field, even if Coase's contribution has received more attention 
than Calabresi's. In fact, Calabresi's paper seems to be "narrower in focus than Coase's" 
(Barreto, Husted and White, 1984, p. 257). This nonetheless ignores one element that 
our paper wants to emphasize, namely the proximity between the works of Calabresi 
and Coase. Certainly Calabresi himself has noted that he was not in disagreement with 
the Coase of "The Nature of the Firm" (1937) and has also noted that after 1937 Coase 
has drifted from a socialist to a libertarian position (see, Calabresi, 1991 b), and this 
lead readers and commentators to think that this implied an evolution away from 
Calabresi. There nonetheless remains similarities between the works of Coase and those 
of Calabresi, and this is what we would like to investigate in this paper. More precisely, 
the purpose of this paper is not to use the the recent reinterpretations of Coase's work 
(Bertrand, 2006, 2009, 2010; Medema, 1994; 1995; Medema and Samuels, 1997) to show 
that he was less of a market economist than and therefore closer to Calabresi than it has 
been assumed. We rather focus on the works of Calabresi, trying to reassess them in 
order to show that, in "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts", 
Calabresi demonstrated a result which is almost identical to what is known as the 
"Coase theorem" (Stigler, 1966, p. 113) and without having read Coase's paper. Thus, 
                                                 
2  The issue of the Journal of Law and Economics which contains Coase's article was published 
in 1961. 3 
Calabresi discovered the Coase theorem before it had even been invented by George 
Stigler. 
This might be surprising a claim since the Coase theorem was presented by Stigler 
his "inventor" as a defense of the efficiency of market mechanisms. By contrast, 
Calabresi is one of the "children" of the Warren Court3. This means that he is a "legal 
liberal"4, a "reformist" and, although not a "judicial activist"5, he nonetheless admit that 
Courts, including Supreme Courts, may in certain circumstances have a political role to 
play—which, it can already be noted, implies at the same time that he believes that 
"legal rules matter" a nd that markets do not spontaneously reach the most efficient 
solution. 
In addition, Calabresi studied law, in the second half of the 1950s, when legal 
liberalism was at its high and from one of the places where legal liberalism played an 
important role, the Law School of the Yale University. Just after having graduated, in 
1958, Calabresi started to teach as a full professor6 and started clerking in 1959 for 
                                                 
3  Earl Warren was the chief justice of the U.S. Supreme court in the 1950s—the so-called 
Warren Court. It was when, "for the first, and perhaps only, time in history the Supreme 
Court—under the leadership of Earl Warren—took on a liberal cast” (Friedman, 2002, p. 159). 
The justices  — at least a majority of them — of the Warren Court were legal liberals, 
convinced that, as jurists and lawyers, they had to be reformers and had a central political 
role to play in the transformation of the society. The “Warren Court Children” (Geoghegan, 
1986, p. 17) “thought lawyers were America's governing class. And the Warren Court was a 
Court of gods” (Geoghegan, 1986, p. 17). After Warren's death, a  special issue of Yale Law 
Journal was quite significantly dedicated "[t]o this man, who made us all proud to be lawyers" 
(1975, p. 405). 
4  According to Laura Kalman, "legal liberalism" ""trust[s] in the potential of courts, particularly 
the Supreme Court, to bring about 'those specific social reforms that affect large groups of 
people such as blacks, or workers, or women, or partisans of a particular persuasion; in other 
words, policy change with nation wide impact'" (1996, p. 2). Kalman quotes Gerald Rosenberg, 
The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change [Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1991], p. 4). The expression “legal liberalism” was relatively frequently used to describe 
the lawyers and jurists of the New Deal period. 
5  Calabresi to author, interview, December 2009. 
6  Calabresi did not only want to be professor but was “anxious” to become “full professor” at 4 
Justice Hugo Black—that is for a judge who not only spent about 50 years in the 
Supreme Court but also, and more importantly for our paper, was close to Warren 7. In 
other words, Calabresi seems to be as remote as one can imagine from the views 
defended by the Coase theorem. Actually, there exist a (major) difference between 
Calabresi's formulation and Stigler's: Calabresi believed that the result was acceptable 
in theory  only and was not valid in practice. After having read Coase, Calabresi's 
explanations evolved but his conclusion remained the same: there exists a Coase axiom, 
did he write, that works only if unrealistic assumptions are made. These statements had 
an interesting, and paradoxical, consequence: scholars started to put Coase and 
Calabresi on the same footing, arguing that both of them had invented "the Coase 
theorem". 
The paper is divided in five sections. We first discuss Calabresi's methodological 
perspective on law and economics, showing that he in fact was rather interested in an 
economic analysis of law (section 2). This allowed him to rationalize legal decisions and 
legal cases and also led him to propose an analysis in which he reached Coasean 
conclusions, without having read Coase (section 3) that he maintained after having read 
Coase (section 4). The we show how the image that Calabresi and Coase had both 
discovered the "Coase theorem" was established and tend to generalize (section 5). A 
                                                                                                                                                        
Yale. The same year, he turned down an offer to join the Kennedy administration in 
Washington and the University of Chicago Law School (see Calabresi, 2003). 
7  Member of the Democratic party and elected at the senate as a representative of the State of 
Alabama from 1926 to 1937, Hugo Black was nominated at the Supreme Court by Franklin 
Roosevelt in 1937 and stayed until 1986. Black is known for being one of the two justices who 
spent the longest term in the Supreme Court — the other one being William O. Douglas. Black 
and Warren regularly met to discuss attribution of opinions and it seems that, most of the 
time, Black chose the opinions he had to deal with (see Newman, 2001, p.686). Although 
Calabresi did not entirely agree with Black, the latter influenced his conception of the political 
role of the Supreme Court: to Calabresi, in certain circumstances, the Court has a political 
role to play (see his books: 1982, 1985). 5 
final section proposes a conclusion. 
2. Calabresi and the first economic analysis of legal rules 
Calabresi wrote his first essays in the mid-late-1950s. In 1955, therefore still a graduate 
student, Calabresi submitted an article to the Yale Law Journal. The paper was 
withdrawn because of the "cold reaction [... of the] outgoing board, which included people 
of unusual brilliance who today properly dominate the profession" (Calabresi, 1991 a, p. 
1482). R evised and submitted again, the paper was eventually published in 1961, 
leading, as Calabresi noted, "to a happy result for me: instead of being published and 
forgotten as an anonymous student comment, the manuscript was set aside to reappear 
four years later, when I was a junior faculty member, as my first article" (Calabresi, 
1991 a, p. 1482). This article was "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts", not only a crucial paper for law and economics but also one of the most important 
papers written by Calabresi, undoubtedly the matrix of his future works. In effect, 
despite the evolution of Calabresi's thought and the differences that exist between his 
different works, it is uneasy to separate his first article from later publications such as 
"The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs" (1965 a), 
"Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven" (1965 b) or 
"Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment" (1968 a). 
Calabresi remained consistent throughout the years and his articles, not only in the 
theses he put forward and in the claims he made but also in the methodology he adopted 
to reach them. 
Let us start with the approach he used. From this perspective, the similar results 
that Calabresi and Coase may have found, and that we will discuss below, were reached 
by radically different routes and methods. Thus, Coase has frequently insisted, 6 
especially in late comments and discussions of the origins of his work, that he was 
trying to solve an economic problem—the possible "divergence between the private and 
social product of the factory ... [whose...] actions ...  have harmful effects on others" 
(Coase, 1960, p. 1)—by taking into account its legal dimension. Thus, Coase wrote: 
""The  Problem of Social Cost" was an essay in economics. It was aimed at 
economists. What I wanted to do was to improve our analysis of the working of the 
economic system. Law came into the article because, in a regime of positive 
transaction costs, the character of the law becomes one of the main factors 
determining the performance of the economy" (1993, pp. 250-251). 
Coase thus remained "an economist" (see, for instance, Coase in Epstein et al. 1997, p. 
1138)8 and was not interested in analysing the legal aspect of the problem. Legal cases, 
and legal rules, remained outside of his theoretical framework. Economists should not 
try to explain their origins but could— and indeed Coase used a lot of them in "The 
Problem of Social Cost"—used them as instances, to illustrate an economic reasoning: 
"in "The Problem of Social Cost" I ... referred to legal cases because they afforded 
examples of real situations as against the imaginary ones normally used by economists 
in their analysis" (Coase, 1993, p. 251). 
Just like Posner did in the early 1970s (see Harnay and Marciano, 2009), Calabresi 
adopted a reverse perspective compared to Coase. First, and not not surprisingly since 
he was a legal scholar, Calabresi was not primarily interested in an economic problem. 
It was rather a very important and topical legal problem—what the two law professors 
at the Chicago University, Charles O. Gregory and Harry Kalven Jr. (1959, p. 689) 
                                                 
8  He argued: “in ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ I used the concept of transaction costs to 
demonstrate the way in which the legal system could affect the working of the economic 
system, and I did not press beyond this” (Coase 1988, p. 35). And: “[F]or me, ‘The Problem of 
Social Cost’ was an essay in economics. It was aimed at economists. What I wanted to do was 
to improve our analysis of the working of the economic system” (Coase 1993, p. 250). 7 
viewed as "the central policy issue in tort law"9—that attracted his attention: the 
determination of a liability rule and the spreading of losses, or the distribution of risks. 
Second, and this is also a difference with Coase, Calabresi was not aiming at dealing 
with the question from an applied but rather from a theoretical perspective. This 
translated into works in which there were few data, cases and examples as it has been 
frequently emphasized10. As a corollary, Calabresi needed a theory that he found in 
economics, to analyse the question and to offer an alternative to what was perceived as 
the standard and dominant view in tort law, as it was expressed in the works of Blum, 
Gregory and Kalven. Therefore, Calabresi departed from the standard legal perspective 
of his time by using economic tools and economic analysis to find an answer to the legal 
question he analysed. He also adopted a different perspective compared to Coase, really 
using economics with the purpose to improve his understanding of legal issues or, more 
precisely, as Frank Michelman would note later, "to provide a conceptual apparatus for 
describing, comprehending, and evaluating systems of accident law" (Michelman, 1971, 
p. 647). Even if the label was not coined before the early 1970s, Calabresi was obviously 
already proposing an economic analysis of tort or accident law. Posner will be one of the 
first to perceive that in the early 1970s (see his review of Calabresi's book, 1970). Blum 
and Kalven had already understood what was Calabresi's perspective when they noted 
                                                 
9  In fact, the analysis Calabresi developed in 1961 was stimulated by the reflections of Gregory 
and Kalven. 
10 For instance, in his review of The Costs of Accidents, Posner emphasized "the untraditional 
character of Calabresi's concerns” (1970, p. 718) as follows: “In neither The Costs of Accidents 
nor the series of earlier articles' of which the book is a summation and amplification will the 
reader find more than passing mention of the rules and concepts that constitute the body of 
accident law or of the procedures and institutions b y which that law is formulated and 
applied. Few cases are discussed and, if I recall correctly, no statutes" (Posner, 1970, p. 718; 
emphasis added). Similarly, Frank Michelman noted that "The Costs of Accidents he Costs of 
Accidents has a somewhat misleading title. There are no data here to interest the National 
Safety Council or Nader's Raiders. In fact, there are no data at all, and thereby hangs one of 
the interesting questions about this book. Calabresi's stated object is to lay a "theoretical 
foundation for accident law"" (1971, p. 647; emphasis added). 8 
that he had "crystallized the economic analysis of liability" (Blum and Kalven, 1967, p. 
240, emphasis added). 
In effect, Calabresi assumed that two criteria can be used to choose a liability rule 
and therefore determine who should bear the burden of the losses economic activities 
generate. Justice, even if certainly not secondary, comes only in second. Questions about 
liability and the goal of accident law “are not meant to herald a metaphysical search for 
ultimate causes” (Calabresi, 1965, p. 725). The latter, or “[g]reat moral issues” (1965, p. 
717), are a matter of “collective choice” (Calabresi, 1965, p. 717) and have to be “decided 
in whatever political way our society chooses to decide moral questions” (Calabresi, 
1965, p. 717). Thus, answers put in terms of justice and fairness would be too “vague” 
(Calabresi, 1961, p. 501), too general and not practical enough. By contrast, questions 
about everyday life situations, about “'rotary mowers versus reel mowers,' 'one method 
of making steel as against another' are questions difficult of collective decision“ (1965, p. 
717), by which Calabresi meant that these questions are too "difficult" to be dealt with 
collectively.  Decisions have to be made individually and have to be practical and cannot 
rest on ethical "principles". Calabresi then suggests that economics be used as a 
criterion to help judges to make their decisions: “the marketplace serves as the rough 
testing ground” (1965, p. 717). In other words, the rules that are not determined at the 
political level, that is by the citizens, have to be determined by judges by using an 
economic criterion. Thus, the assignment of liability should be made by using what 
Calabresi also names “the ‘allocation of resources’ justification” (Calabresi, 1961, p. 502). 
Of particular interest for an history of law and economics and for an analysis of 
Calabresi's contribution to the field, we must note that Calabresi learned about the 
importance of economics for legal issues and how to answer these questions by using 
economics by studying legal cases and legal decision making. Evidently, he was not as 9 
precise and affirmative as Posner was in his analysis of the Learned Hand rule (1972). 
For instance, Calabresi noted that economic theory might have been too sophisticated 
for judges—I do not suggest, of course, that 19th century judges made the transfer to 
fault liability on the basis of this rather complicated economic theory" (1961, p. 516), 
namely that "that proper "long run" allocation of resources required that industry be 
spared from paying hidden accident costs-at least unless other factors like fault were 
involved" (Calabresi, 1961, p. 516). But, he nonetheless believed that the statements 
made by judges represented "a rough and ready, noneconomist's, way of recognizing" 
(1961, p. 516) an economic result. Therefore, when reading "Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts", we realize that Calabresi developed a normative 
view on the role of economics in judicial decision making from a positive observation of 
the decisions made by judges. 
3. Calabresi's invention of the Coase theorem 
The originality and importance of Calabresi's early comes from the acknowledgement of 
the dual or reciprocal dimension of liability in tort or accident law. Reciprocity—the 
“reciprocal character of the components of the ... costs accidents impose” (Calabresi, 
1970, p. 638)—can be found in almost all his works11. It was so strikingly obvious that it 
                                                 
11 For instance, in the  The Decision for Accidents, Calabresi noted that “[W]e build a tunnel 
under Mont Blanc because it is essential to the Common Market and cuts down the travelling 
time from Rome to Paris, though we know that about one man per kilometre of tunnel will die. 
We take planes and cars rather than safer, slower means of travel. And perhaps most telling, 
we use relatively safe equipment rather than the safest imaginable because—and it is not a 
bad reason—the safest costs too much” (1965, p. 716; see also 1970, pp. 17-18; emphasis 
added). In Tragic Choices, he develops the same argument (1982; see also 1985, cars cause 
carnage but save lives too). For Calabresi, therefore, tort law or accident law appears to be a 
matter of reciprocity: “In torts law, we have become accustomed to the fact that many 
activities are permitted, even though statistically we know they will cost lives, since it costs 
too much to engage in these activities more safely or to abstain from them altogether. We have 
grade crossings, even though we know that with grade crossings a certain number of people 10 
is one of the first element of Calabresi's 1970  The Costs of Accidents  that Posner 
emphasized and discussed in his review of the book. However, Calabresi did not wait the 
1970s to realize how important it was to a system of tort or accident law. In his 1961 
article, he clearly stated the problem of the attribution of liability in  non-Pigovian 
terms—therefore adopting a frame of analysis which was exactly the same as the one 
adopted by Coase and in which the reciprocal dimension of liability is central. Thus, for 
someone who would have adopted a Pigovian perspective, it would not have been 
debated whether or not an enterprise or an industry has to bear the cost of its activities 
generate for the rest of the society or, if the injurer has to be liable for the consequences 
of his or her activities. The injurer, the tortfeasor would be liable for his or her actions. 
By contrast, Calabresi started his analysis by questioning this belief. In effect, he asked 
whether it should always be the case and who should actually bear the costs of economic 
activities: Are they the firms, or "[t]hose classes of people "most able" to pay?", 
(Calabresi, 1961, p. 499) or have the losses to  be spread, "both interpersonally and 
intertemporally" as broadly as it is possible (Calabresi, 1961, p. 499)?  
From an economic, or a law and economics, perspective, Calabresi's position is as 
radically original as was Coase's who was, at exactly the same period, building his 
analysis on the same point. And it may have been original for certain legal scholars. It 
was not, however, uncommon that judges and courts based their decisions on 
"reciprocity". This is exactly what Coase noted in "The Problem of Social Cost" when he 
                                                                                                                                                        
will be killed each year and even though grade crossings could be eliminated relatively easily. 
We use auto mobiles? Knowing that they cost us fifty thousand lives each year? because to use 
safer, slower means of transport would be far too costly in terms of pleasures and profits 
foregone. Worse even than that, we use automobiles with relatively cheap (but relatively 
dangerous) tires, airports with relatively cheap (but relatively dangerous) control systems, 
and so on ad infinitum. And we do this because we deem the lives taken to be cheaper than 
the costs of avoiding the accidents in which they are taken” (Calabresi, 1969, p. 387). 11 
praised judges for understanding what most economists fail to recognize, namely that 
liability involves two parties and therefore that is is a two-sided problem (1960, p. 19). 
This is also exactly what Calabresi stressed, insisting that judges in the U.S.A. during 
the 19th century tended to adopt a rule of nonfault liability, according to which they did 
not always attribute the liability of an action to the firms that had caused the damage. 
Thus, Just like Coase said that liability should be decided by a comparison between "the 
value of what is obtained [... to ...] the value of what is sacrificed to obtain it" (1960, p. 
2), "the value of the fish lost [... to ...] the value of the product which the contamination 
of the stream makes possible" (1960, p. 2), Calabresi claimed that judges had understood 
what was at stake in terms of economic efficiency: when they ruled that an "industry 
was simply not ready to bear all of its costs, and that the country would in the long run 
be better off if it did not." (Calabresi, 1961, p. 516), they clearly meant that one has to 
compare what an industry costs to the country to what it brings to decide who is liable 
and who has to bear the costs of his actions. 
From the economic perspective that judges adopted in some of their decisions, and 
that Calabresi actually explained and theorized in his 1961 article, that is “under a 
strict resource-allocation theory” (Calabresi, 1961, p. 505), it was then possible to give 
an answer to these legal questions that otherwise appeared to be difficult, or tricky, to 
answer: "the most desirable system of loss distribution ... is one in which the prices of 
goods accurately reflect their full cost to society" (Calabresi, 1961, p. 505; emphasis 
added)—that is one which reconciles the private and social costs of activities. It thus 
appears that the determination of a liability rule is viewed as an instance of the same 
debate as the one to which Coase's name is usually connected. And Calabresi once again 
adopts a non-Pigovian perspective by writing that costs do not have necessarily to be 
borne by the injurer. Actually, "the costs of injuries should ... be borne by the activities 12 
which caused them or be placed on the party which is most likely to cause the burden to 
be reflected in t he price of whatever the enterprise sells" (Calabresi, 1961, p. 505). 
Calabresi even went one step further. He was very clear about the conclusion that could 
be reached from the use of an economic analysis, that he also names a "pure loss-
distribution theory" (1961, p. 506): the assignment of the burden of costs, the 
distribution of losses or the assignment of liability to one party or the other has no 
impact on the allocation of resources. Thus, to use Calabresi's own words: "[t]here are 
naturally, some situations where ... it actually  does not matter who bears the loss 
initially” (Calabresi, 1961, p. 506; emphasis added). 
Thus, Calabresi established two results that that are usually although not always 
simultaneously associated with the Coase theorem: first, the external effects of 
individual activities can be internalized if or when prices include the costs imposed to 
the society; second, in certain circumstances, legal rules do not matter. It is particularly 
interesting to note here that Calabresi was the first to reach a conclusion that  the 
Chicagoan economists viewed as an "heresy" (Stigler, 1988, p. 76) and as 
"extraordinarily unobvious" (Stigler, 1972, p. 11) when Coase presented his article for 
the first time in 1960 in Aaron Director's living room and that economists acknowledged 
only in the early 1970s as the "invariance" thesis (Borcherding, 1970, p. 948; Regan, 
1972, p. 427). Also notable is that this thesis did not appear in the 1966 version of the 
Coase theorem. Stigler included it in the theorem in 1972 only (Medema, forthcoming, p. 
26). 
Thus, Coase and Calabresi adopted the same starting point—the problem has a 
twofold, reciprocal dimension— and reached the same conclusions. More precisely, what 
is interesting is not exactly that Calabresi discovered the same result as Coase but 
rather that he gave these results a form that economists would acknowledge later. 13 
In addition, Calabresi did not explain the result by using the same variables. Among 
the conditions that have to be satisfied, Calabresi did not mention "transaction costs" in 
1961. And the the illustrations he gave did not show that he believed that the costs of 
bargaining were a key-variable that would explain that (or why) private arrangements 
would lead to efficient outcomes. In fact, to Calabresi and this is a difference with Coase, 
transaction costs appeared as secondary to other explanatory elements that therefore 
have to be taken into account as primary factors. These primary factors were those upon 
which Calabresi insisted in his first writings, where he explained that liability rules 
have no impact on the allocation of resources only from the perspective of "traditional 
economic t heory" (1961, p. 505; emphasis added) or "[i]n terms of ‘pure’ resource-
allocation-loss-distribution theory" (Calabresi, 1961, p. 505; emphasis added). Now, from 
such theoretical perspective, transaction costs were not viewed as be a crucial variable 
at all and the level of transaction costs was not presented as an issue. Much more 
important were the behavioral assumptions that economists put at the core of their 
analyses, namely the rationality of individuals. 
The secondary role of transaction costs, vis-à-vis to rationality, makes sense because, 
from the theoretical perspective that economists retain, that is in the perfect world of 
economics, transaction costs are necessarily equal to zero because individuals are 
rational. Because of their assumed rationality, individuals are not only able to calculate 
the costs and benefits associated with their actions. They also have all the information 
that is necessary to make such calculus. In "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Tort", Calabresi argued that the pure-loss-distribution theory “presupposes 
and all-knowing, all rational economic world” (Calabresi, 1961, p. 506) and he added 
that, 
“in a world populated by such ["rational," "all-knowing," economic] men, 14 
proper resource allocation would often result no matter who bore the initial 
risk of loss. Thus, the “rational” worker in a purely competitive world would 
demand higher wages if his job involved a substantial risk of accident and 
the company did not provide him with insurance for it. As a result, putting 
accident costs on worker or company would not matter“ (Calabresi, 1961, p. 
515). 
After having insisted on the fact that the result —“it does not matter who bear the 
loss initially”— is theoretically valid and centered his explanation on the rationality of 
individuals, rather than transaction costs, Calabresi noted that human beings actually 
do not live in the perfect world described by economists. And therefore, one has to move 
from the theory to the reality, which is not without consequences. First, in the “real 
world”, the allocation of resources does not take place through competitive markets but 
result from the exercise of monopoly power. Second, even when markets are competitive, 
problems may arise because individuals do not have the same insurance costs to face 
(1961, p. 406). Then, he proceeded to a third, and certainly more important reason. 
Calabresi claimed that individuals are not, in contrast to what economic theory 
assumes, rational. They do not possess the same capacity to gather and to process 
information. Thus, in the real world, in practice, there obviously exist subjective 
differences between individuals that must not be neglected: "in the real world not all 
parties evaluate losses equally” (1961, p. 506). The personal and subjective evaluations 
of risks vary from one individual to the other and above all are not precise — these are 
“guesses”. They cannot reflect the actual value of the risk for the individual12. This 
implies that a sum paid to an individual to compensate him or her from a risk may 
correspond to his or her evaluation but it will likely differ from the actual loss he or she 
will have to face. It thus cannot be said that it makes no difference to let a risk be born 
                                                 
12 “Before workmen's compensation the individual worker simply did not evaluate the risk of 
injury to be as great as it actually was. He took his chances; and even if he did not wish to 
take his chances, the fact that other workmen took a chance forced him to do the same, or to 
starve” (1961, p. 506). 15 
by one party or by the other. 
These remarks allow us to give a complete statement of Calabresi's conclusion. The 
economic—or loss-distribution—argument is t heoretically  correct but “ in fact 
inaccurate” (Calabresi, 1961, p. 506; emphasis added). Thus, in theory, legal rules do not 
matter but they actually do and effectively affect the allocation of resources, which 
means, even if Calabresi did not use the word, that his analysis contributed to 
corroborate the thesis that there are market failures that must be corrected. And, as a 
lawyer and as a legal liberal convinced that judges have a role to play, he concluded that 
judges have a role to play in the functioning  of the economy and in the allocation of 
resources. 
4. A Coasean turn towards the Coase Axiom 
Calabresi's demonstration was, it can be said, finalized. And there will not be 
fundamental differences between "Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of 
Torts" and Calabresi's next papers, such as "The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to 
Nonfault Allocation of Costs" (1965) and "Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and 
Liability Rules—A Comment" (1968 a). The main difference results from the fact that 
Calabresi had started to write his first article before the publication of "The Problem of 
Social Cost" and, possibly, before Coase had started to write it. But he wrote his next 
articles after having read Coase. It is not only that Calabresi made references to Coase 
that is important but rather that he a Coasean tone to his analysis and demonstration—
without, of course, altering his own views and departing from his conclusions. 
Thus, in 1965, Calabresi repeated again that “[t]here are, happily, some situations in 
which it will not matter which of two activities initially bears the cost of an accident” 
(1965, p. 725). In the same article, he pointed again that "it ultimately makes no 16 
difference whether the dock owner or the shipowner in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. 
Co.20 is held liable for damage to the dock caused by an unexpected storm” (Calabresi, 
1965, p. 726) and also that 
"[t]heoreticians13 will insist that in terms of "general" deterrence of 
accident-prone activities it makes no difference either way ... [that] the cost 
of industrial accidents be put on workers or on their employers ... [or] the cost 
of rotary as against reel lawn mowers be borne by the manufacturers or the 
users" (Calabresi, 1965, p. 725-726) 
And then, later, he used more economic terms to present exactly the same conclusion: 
"the same allocation of resources will come about regardless of which of two joint cost 
causers is initially charged with the cost, in other words regardless of liability rules" 
(Calabresi, 1968 a, p. 67; emphasis added). The last part of the quotation is particularly 
interesting because it points to one of the corollary of the general conclusion put forward 
by Calabresi: liability rules, or more broadly, legal rules do not affect the allocation of 
resources. Once a gain, Calabresi insisted on the "invariance" of the allocation of 
resources under various liability rules. 
This time, Calabresi gave an explanation that can be viewed as more Coasean than 
the one given in 1961 since he devotes an entire section (pp. 726-733) to the analysis of 
"bargaining situations". He thus notes that there are "happily" (1965, p. 725) in which 
legal rules do not affect the allocation of resources. It happens when parties are “related 
by bargaining” (Calabresi, 1965, p. 726). It makes no difference to let the burden of costs 
fall on one party or the other because they are able to search for and use the “least 
expensive way to minimize the loss ... whichever of the two is initially liable" (Calabresi, 
1965, p. 726). In other words, it could be said that he started his analysis by agreeing 
with Coase. But Calabresi insisted again on the same limitation, a problem that is 
                                                 
13 Calabresi was wpeaking of Blum and Kalven (1964) 17 
certainly not taken into account in Coase's analysis, namely that there exist differences 
between individuals in terms of t heir capacity to estimate the risks and the 
consequences of their actions: "one of the two actors may, in practice, be far better able 
than the other to evaluate the accident risk, that is, the expected accident costs" 
(Calabresi, 1965, p. 726; emphasis added). Therefore, it is only when such difference 
between individuals does not exist, that is "in theory" (Calabresi, 1965, p. 726) and "that 
"[i]n a perfect world such a bargaining relationship will always result in the appropriate 
minimization of the loss" (Calabresi, 1965, p. 730). In general, and in practice, "we 
cannot assume that it makes no difference, in terms of accident deterrence, who is 
saddled with the original liability” (Calabresi, 1965, p. 731; emphasis added). 
The Decision for Accidents: An  Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, thus 
published in 1965, is not only interesting for the references to Coase and the Coasean 
turn in Calabresi's explanations. Also, Calabresi criticized the Coase negotiation result, 
stressing a difference, that no one had perceived up to that point, between the short-run 
and the long-run: while in the short-run, the allocation of resources is independent from 
the liability rule, it might not be the case in the long-run and therefore the nature of 
liability rule matters (Calabresi, 1965, p. 730 and 731). What appears to be the first 
incorrectness claim raised against Coase14 played an important role in the respective 
reputations of Coase and Calabresi. The latter in effect wrote a paper——entitled 
"Transaction Costs, R esource Allocation and Liability Rules—A Comment" (emphasis 
added)— to explain that he was wrong. The article was published in the 1968 April issue 
of the  Journal of Law and Economics. From this perspective, the way Calabresi 
acknowledge his misinterpretation of Coase's reasoning, and the total and unambiguous 
                                                 
14 I thank Steve Medema for stressing this point. 18 
agreement he expressed with Coase, are more interesting than the mistake in itself. 
Thus, one reads under the pen of Calabresi that "further thoughts" (Calabresi, 1968 a, p. 
67) had "convinced" him that 
"if one assumes no transaction— costs-including no costs of excluding from 
the benefits the free loaders, that is, those who would gain from a bargain 
but who are unwilling to pay to bring it about—and if one assumes, as one 
must, rationality and no legal impediments to bargaining, Coase's analysis 
must hold for the long run as well as the short run" (Calabresi, 1968 a, p. 67). 
Therefore, Calabresi had no more objections to put against the arguments made by 
Coase in "The Problem of Social Cost". He could then conclude without hesitation and 
without any reserve that, under certain conditions "all misallocations of resources would 
be fully cured in the market by bargains" (Calabresi, 1968 a, p. 68; emphasis in 
original). Even more precisely, in a more complete form, Calabresi stated the following 
result: 
"If people are rational, bargains are costless, and there are no legal 
impediments to bargains, transactions will ex hypothesis occur to the point 
where bargains can no longer improve the situation; to the point, in short, of 
optimal resource allocation. We can, therefore, state as an  axiom the 
proposition that all externalities can be internalized and all misallocations, 
even those created by legal structures, can be remedied by the market, except 
to the extent that transactions cost money or the structure itself creates 
some impediments to bargaining" (Calabresi, 1968 a, p. 68; emphasis added). 
These quotations are remarkable. First, the paper was published two years after the 
publication of the third edition of Stigler's  The Theory of Price, in which the Coase 
theorem had been for the first time presented. However, Calabresi did not make any 
reference to the theorem—it is hard to say if he knew the last version of Stigler's 
textbook—even though he knew previous editions that he quoted in  "Some Thoughts on 
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts". That Calabresi used the word "axiom" just after 
Stigler had spoken of "theorem" is certainly not a proof even if the coincidence is 
striking. 
Second, it is also quite notable that, in 1968, for the first time Calabresi made a 19 
reference to "transaction costs" (Calabresi, 1968, p. 67 and 68) that he presented as 
obstacles, "legal impediments to bargains" (Calabresi, 1968, p. 68; emphasis added)—
that he nonetheless blended with his belief in the role of the subjective perception of 
risks: “[t]he transaction costs which attach to a bargaining situation, and hence to most 
products liability cases, are generally those of differentiation and risk awareness” 
(Calabresi and Bass, 1970, p. 77). Later in 1968, another of Calabresi's article was 
published on the same issue. Not only Calabresi insisted on the same result—"[a]pure 
market system would allocate accident costs to the acts or activities (or combinations of 
them) which could avoid the accident costs most cheaply" (1968 b, p. 436)—but also the 
analysis almost exclusively revolved around transaction costs: "[i]f there were no 
transaction costs and no information costs associated with paying people to alter their 
behavior, it would not matter (in terms of market control of accidents) who bore the 
accident costs initially" (1968 b, p. 436) but because "in reality transactions are often 
terribly expensive, it is often not worthwhile spending both the cost of the transaction 
and  the amount needed to induce someone else to diminish his accident-causing 
behavior" (1968 b, p. 436)15.  
This reference to the role of transaction costs could be an indirect proof that Calabresi 
was indeed acquainted with Stigler's Coase theorem. Another evidence that Calabresi 
could have been aware of the Coase theorem is that, and it is a third point to stress, he 
no longer referred to the two complementary results that he put forward in his 1961 
article, namely that private and social costs are equal if there are no transaction costs 
                                                 
15 In the same article, as if not totally convinced with his own analysis, Calabresi came back to 
the question of the validity of Coase's analysis in the long-run: " liability rules can have a 
broader, long-run effect. They can change the relative profits of the activities involved and so 
affect the relative number of car makers and cars, pedestrians, and television makers in my 
examples" (1968 b, p. 438, n. 14). 20 
and that legal rules do not matter. Calabresi insisted only on the "internalization of 
externalities"16—a result that was not controversial and that corresponded, as 
mentioned above, to Stigler's Coase theorem as expressed in 1966. 
Fourth, Calabresi took care to list all the conditions that had to be fulfilled to reach 
an optimal allocation of resources, as if to insist on the difficulty to obtain such a result; 
to stress the validity of the result, as Stigler did, was one thing, but one could not forget 
the circumstances in which this result holds. This was reminiscent of the distinction 
established in his previous works, about the "theoretical validity" and the "practical 
inaccuracy" of Coase's result. No surprise, thus, if Calabresi complemented his claims 
about the existence of a Coase axiom with a conclusion in which he "reduced" the 
analysis made by Coase as "an admirable tool for suggesting what kind of empirical data 
would be useful in making resource allocation decisions, and for indicating what kinds of 
guesses are likely to be justifiably made in the absence of convincing data" (Calabresi, 
1968, 73). However, one could not go that far as using "Coase's analysis to suggest that 
little or no government intervention is usually the best rule" (Calabresi, 1968, p. 73). In 
fact, Coase's analysis only "explain various types of heretofore inadequately justified 
governmental actions" (Calabresi, 1968, p. 73) but "more precise data" are required to 
"prove some of these interventions to be improper from the standpoint of resource 
allocation" (Calabresi, 1968, p. 73). Calabresi accepted Coase's analysis and agreed that 
it could be generalized as an axiom but one with a limited scope17. 
                                                 
16 Let us note also that the use of the word "externalities"—a word that Coase did not like and 
therefore did not use, even if most of the contributors to the "debate" on the problem of social 
cost did. 
17 Calabresi even defends Coase against Blum and Kalven who rejected Coase's analysis 
because, first, “there are always transaction costs” and, second, economics has much to say to 
help jurists in deciding which liability rule to use. 21 
Therefore, an analysis of Calabresi's works shows  that he shared with Coase the 
belief that, in some circumstances, it does not matter who is liable in the first place or 
who bears the costs of one's actions. The explanation Calabresi gave nonetheless differs 
from that given by Coase. While the later insisted on the role of transaction costs, the 
former argued that it would occur in a world peopled with rational individuals. In other 
words, both Coase and Calabresi agree that in a perfect world liability rules would have 
no impact on efficiency. However, C oase believes that imperfections originate from 
positive transaction costs, while Calabresi identifies the source of market failures in the 
presence of monopolies and, more importantly, from irrational behavior More precisely, 
one must note that Calabresi's thought evolved and he eventually acknowledged the role 
of transaction costs. But this did not lead him to change his mind: to him, what is known 
as the Coase theorem and that he labelled the "Coase axiom" indeed rests on unrealistic 
assumptions.  
5. Calabresi as the co-inventor of the Coase theorem 
In the first half of the 1950s, market failures and, in particular, the problems that public 
goods and externalities could represent to an optimal allocation of resources curiously 
did not attract much attention among economists. Very few articles were written about 
the question; Meade (1951), Scitovsky (1954), Bator (1957) are exceptions. And when it 
was discussed, the phenomenonwas found "unimportant" (Scitovsky, 1954, p. 145) 
because "examples of it seem to be few and exceptional” (Scitovsky, 1954, p. 145). It is in 
the late 1950s and early 1960s that the possible divergence between public and private 
cost became topical. Among the papers that were published at that time about 
externalities, market failures a nd market efficiency, and besides Coase's, there are 
Buchanan's 1959 and (co-authored with Craig Stubblebine) 1962 articles and 22 
Calabresi's. And, as is well known, "The Problem of Social Cost" is the only one that 
attracted the attention of economists. It  was not immediate, though. In particular, not 
before the mid-1960s. This can be explained by the fact that, among the factors that 
played a certain role in this process, Coase's move from the University of Virginia to the 
Law School of the University of Chicago was important. In the mide1960s, the 
department of economics of the University of Chicago had already acquired a certain 
prestige. The names of Knight and Viner, but also those of Friedman and Stigler were 
already well known and the idea that there e xisted a Chicagoan tradition in 
economics—or, a Chicago School of Economics—had already been put forward (see 
Miller, 1962)18. Coase's move to Chicago gave visibility to his work. In addition, the 
establishment of the Coase theorem by George Stigler in 1966 was also determining for, 
without doubt, what Stigler wrote in the third edition of his Theory of Price contributed 
to make "The Problem of Social Cost" visible and gave Coase's analysis a very specific 
turn. After Stigler, the Coase theorem, rather than Coase's article, became the object of 
attention of legal scholars and economists. 
In the meantime, Calabresi's articles remained unnoticed by economists19; about ten 
citations in academic journals can be found in the entire decade that follows the 
publication of his first article in 1961. One could be tempted to explain this phenomenon 
                                                 
18 Significantly and surprisingly, Miller included Coase in this tradition even though Coase was 
not at Chicago. This is one of the point that Stigler emphasized in his answer to Miller 
("Ronald Coase ... has never taught here", Stigler, 1962, p. 71). The main argument Miller put 
forward is that Chicagoans are pro-market economists and so was Coase in 1959 article of the 
Federal Communications Commission. Stigler argued that Miller "has not described ... a 
unifying ethical or political philosophy or an articulate and reasonably  specific policy 
program" (Stigler, 1962, p. 71). One may say that, in this condition, it is even more 
remarkable to see that Coase was viewed as a Chicagoan: his thought was indeed viewed as a 
strong defence of market mechanisms. 
19 Similarly, legal scholars did not pay attention to Calabresi's works that were not cited nor 
quoted or even mentioned (with the exception of Blum, Kalven and Gregory). 23 
by the fact that his works were published in law journals, that economists did not read. 
But even when he published papers in journals edited by economists, this did not alter 
the situation. Thus, Calabresi's 1968 article was published in the Journal of Law and 
Economics did not contributed to make his work visible. A particularly good instance is 
given by "The Coase Theorem on Social Cost: A Footnote" written by Warren G. Nutter, 
an economist at the University of Virginia and thus a former colleague of Coase. A 
defense of the Coase theorem 20, Nutter's article was published in October of the same 
year and in the same journal as Calabresi's paper. It was not only about exactly the 
same issue as Calabresi's 1968 paper—the validity of the Coase theorem in the long run. 
It was about the point that Calabresi had been the first and only one to emphasize. 
Therefore, Nutter's "footnote" was only directed against Calabresi. This could have been 
an opportunity to read Calabresi's work. Actually, Nutter gave a broad turn to his paper 
noting that "[q]uestions have been raised, however, as to whether the Coase theorem 
applies to the allocation of resources in the long run" (1968, p. 503) and was precisely 
aimed at showing that the Coase theorem applies to the long-run as well as the short-
run allocation of resources" (Nutter, 1968, p. 504). In other words, Nutter was primarily 
interested in Coase and not in Calabresi. 
In his article, Nutter did not particularly pay attention to transaction costs. He wrote 
that the Coase theorem meant that "market transactions will have the same 
consequences as internal management no matter what the property structure, provided 
only that costs of transactions are negligible" (1968, p. 503; emphasis added). However, 
                                                 
20 Stigler recounted that Nutter "was scheduled to give a talk at Rochester at a workshop 
entitled something like, "The Fallacy of the Coase Theorem." But he made the mistake of 
taking a plane from Charlottesville and sitting next to Friedman and when he got to 
Rochester the paper was retitled "A New Proof of the Coase Theorem"' (Stigler, in Kitch, 1983, 
p. 227). 24 
this assumption was going to attract more interest, and criticisms, in the last years of 
the decade when scholars started to emphasize the lack of realism of the assumptions on 
which rests the Coase theorem. Most significant are the statements made during a 
conference organized at Stanford University by the Joint Committee appointed by the 
Association of American Law Schools and the American Economic Association with the 
purpose “to explore the possibilities of collaborative efforts between the two 
organizations” (report 1)21. Most of the participants, in spite of many disagreements, 
nonetheless agreed on a twofold idea: on the one hand, "Coase is right if one accepts the 
basic assumptions" (McKean, 1970 a, p. 31) upon which his analysis rests which, on the 
other hand, "are fairly heroic" (McKean, 1970 a, p. 31). Accordingly, "they do not hold in 
the real world" (McKean, 1970, p. 31; emphasis added)22. Robert Dorfman, an economist 
from Harvard University, compared economics with physics and economists with 
"ballistic experts": the law of gravity "works best in a vacuum ... [but] ... is not helpful at 
all in predicting more terrestrial projectories" (Dorfman in Manne, 1978, p. 122; 
                                                 
21 The Joint Committee, chaired by economist and law and economics specialist Henry Manne, 
met a first time in Chicago on November 12, 1966. A conference was planned for 1968, to be 
supported by the Walter E. Meyer foundation. "Product Liability: Economic Analysis and the 
Law" as a topic for the conference because it was assumed that "product liability [was] an area 
of particular interest for economists and lawyers" (report 1, Stigler papers). Product liability 
was one of the three topics that were envisaged for the conference. The others two areas were: 
criminal law  — and antitrust (report, AER, 1967). Roland McKean was invited to write a 
monograph on the subject. Two economists (James Buchanan and Robert Dorfman) and two 
law professors (Guido Calabresi and Grant Gilmore) were chosen to comment McKean's paper 
that was entitled "Products Liability: Trends and Implications"—McKean wrote a second, 
more economical, version of his paper that was published in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 
22 The claim that Coase's approach of the problem of social cost was "unrealistic" and therefore 
useless was new among economists. It was not new to legal scholars. Among others, Blum and 
Kalven had already noted this problem. In one of their articles, they explained that "[i]n the 
eyes of the bar another Utopian approach to the auto accident problem coming from economics 
would be an effort to adopt the general analysis offered by Ronald Coase" (Blum and Kalven, 
1964, p. 264) precisely because "[a]s far as we can see, the relationship between the parties 
involved in auto accidents is too remote from any conceivable bargaining arrangement to 
make this analysis usable" (Blum and Kalven, 1964, p. 264).  25 
emphasis added); economists, like "ballistics experts", are "not concerned with problems 
in a vacuum" (Dorfman in Manne, 1970, p. 122; emphasis added) but are interested in 
"actual markets" (Dorfman in Manne, 1970, p. 122). Similarly, Grant Gilmore, a law 
professor at the University of Chicago, accepting McKean's claims, insisted on the 
necessity to acknowledge a difference "between Professor Coase's world in which there 
are no transaction costs and all exchanges are voluntary and a world in which there are 
always transaction costs and few, if any, exchanges that are voluntary" (Gilmore, 1970, 
p. 106). Although he doubted that Coase's "abstract theoretical analysis ... gives us, or is 
meant to give us, guidance in handling real problems in the real world" (Gilmore, 1970, 
p. 116). 
As a consequence of this need for a realistic theory, scholars started to turn towards 
Calabresi's works in which they found, at the same time, the acceptation of an 
unrealistic theory and also its rejection for possible applications in the "real world". 
From this perspective, the findings of Calabresi appeared to be broader and more 
complete than Coase's or, at least, than the Coase theorem. No surprise if the idea that 
Coase and Calabresi had developed the same arguments and reached the same 
conclusions spread in the early 1970s. In other words, as soon as Calabresi's work were 
acknowledged and quoted, they were put on the same footing as Coase's and both 
Calabresi and Coase credited for having discovered the result of the "Coase theorem". 
Actually, Calabresi is cited or quoted for having "summarized" or, alternatively, 
"generalized" and "clarified" the result found by Coase. One of the first quotations that 
goes in that direction was made by Douglas Ayer who noted that Calabresi is "generally" 
(Ayer, 1969, p. 696, fn 11) the reference for the following result: 
"If there were no transaction costs, no legal impediments to bargaining, and 
the windfall-seeking condenmees were all rational,t hey could work out 
among themselves a contractual arrangement that would ensure that their 26 
demands did not exceed, individually or in the aggregate, the monopoly tolls 
that the condemnor could pay and still benefit from the public improvement" 
(Ayer, 1969, p. 696). 
Also, from this perspective, an interesting reference to mention is Richard Posner's 
conclusion in the review of The Costs of Accidents, according to which "for reasons first 
explained in a classic article by Ronald Coase and well summarized by Calabresi, it is 
not always an easy trick to [find a solution that] will produce the same result as would 
private contracting" (1970, p. 640; emphasis added). One year later, G.A. Mumey made a 
similar claim: Calabresi generalized the Coase theorem established by Stigler (1971, p. 
718). In 1972, in an essay entitled "The Problem of S ocial Cost Revisited" aimed at 
showing that the Coase theorem is "open to doubt", Donald Regan found more 
convenient to start his analysis with a reference to Calabresi rather than with a 
quotation from Coase, arguing that Calabresi had "stated more clearly" (Regan,1972, p. 
428) an argument that was only "implicit in Coase's original article" (Regan, 1972, p. 
428). Similarly, Harvard law professor Lawrence Tribe spoke of a "now almost 
traditional ... analysis to the legal problem of how to assign "rights" and liabilities"—for 
example, between polluters and breathers" (Tribe, 1972, p. 86) and also of "[t]he 
currently popular analysis traceable to the works of Ronald Coase and Guido Calabresi" 
(Tribe, 1972, p. 86). 
Certainly, the reference to Calabresi and to Coase, most of the time—not for Posner, 
obviously—, was made to stress the conditions that limit the validity of the Coase 
theorem. Thus, when Warren Schwartz (1971, p. 719) referred to Calabresi's 
"Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules-A Comment" (1968), it was 
to indicate it as the article in which could be found "a brief but incisive discussion of the 
circumstances in which market transactions can be relied on to produce the socially 
desirable result in cases of this kind". Similarly, Joseph Sax noted that "the 27 
substantiality of transaction costs in organizing a fully informed market suggests the 
inadequacy of reliance solely upon private negotiation" (1971, p. 174). Later, Alan 
Randall argued that, with his 1968 article, Calabresi "spoke for the proponents of 
market solutions in 1968: all externalities can be internalized and all misallocations can 
be remedied by the market except to the extent that transactions cost money" (1972, p. 
176). 
To be more precise, the result which is co-attributed to Calabresi and Coase is not 
only that there are transaction costs or that the Coase theorem is necessarily wrong. It 
is interesting to note that scholars tended to make a difference between the perfect 
world of the theory—in which carefully selected assumptions allow markets to be 
efficient—and the real world—in which frictions, and in particular transaction costs 
prevent market efficiency. Therefore, the Coase theorem was not rejected in principle 
but accepted as theoretically valid and as false in practice, or, more precisely as people 
became accustomed to say, in the real world. And Calabresi was always mentioned in 
the discussions of this difference. For instance, Tribe argued that the distinction 
between “an ideal world of free transactions, free competition, and full information [in 
which] economic efficiency (in the sense of Pareto-optimality) would be achieved without 
regard to how rights ... are assigned by law” (1972, p. 86) and "the real world, where 
transactions (for instance, coalitions of breathers to bribe polluters to reduce pollution) 
are far from free" (1972, p. 86) can be found in Coase and in Calabresi. For his part, A. 
Mitchell Polinsky did not only mention Calabresi for having demonstrated that 
"transaction costs are all the costs which inhibit competitive markets from working" 
(1974, p. 1667) but also note that the "zero transaction costs assumption is ... more likely 
to be invalid in the real world" (1974, p. 1667: italics in original; emphasis added). More 
recently—since it appears that this identification between Coase and Calabresi lasts—28 
Alan J. Meese mentioned Calabresi's 1968 article Transaction Costs, Resource 
Allocation, and Liability Rules-A Comment to support the result that "In a world with 
no transaction costs, tort  law would not be necessary. Instead, injurers and victims 
would bargain among themselves to produce the mix of activities and care that would 
maximize their own and thus society's wealth" (2001, p. 1201). Or, Michael Ashley Stein 
in "The Law and Economics of Disability Accommodations" noted that 
"[i]n this transaction-cost-free world, private bargains move resources to 
their highest-valued use and thus maximise the wealth than can be obtained 
from society's existing resources. In such a perfect world, employment 
practices would being with an individualized determination of each potential 
employee's productivity, costs, and benefits ... The real (economic) world is 
not, however, wholly bereft of transaction costs in this sense—even Professor 
Ronald Coase didn't think so" (Stein, 2003, p. 158). 
On the contrary, they were put on the same footing for having demonstrated the 
same, twofold, result. On the one hand, from a theoretical perspective, it makes no 
difference to place costs or liability on one party or on the other because parties are able 
to devise private, market-like, arrangements allowing them to reach an efficient 
allocation of resources. Thus, the market does not necessarily fail when activities 
generate external effects. However, on the other hand, the conditions to satisfy to reach 
such efficiency were viewed as too strong to be actually met; as a consequence, the 
existence of a gap between private and social costs at least revealed the existence of 
market failures and possibly led to a claim in favor of the intervention of the State23. 
4. Conclusion 
From the perspective of the history of the law and economics movement, Calabresi's 
contributions worth being mentioned because he reached similar conclusions as those 
                                                 
23 Coase never clarified this point—apparently because he himself believed in the existence of a 
difference between theory and practice (see Medema). 29 
known as the Coase theorem, although  independently from Coase and without 
knowledge of "The Problem of Social Cost" by using economics to analyze legal rules—he 
used economics to theorize some of the decisions made by judges in the 19th century. His 
economic analysis of legal rules and legal decisions allowed him to state what will be 
known in the 1970s as the "invariance" proposition— according to which "liability rules 
have no impact on the allocation of resources". He then demonstrated that the 
proposition might be valid from a theoretical perspective—by which he meant, under the 
assumptions used by economists—but has no empirical content or, to put in other words, 
is wrong outside of the perfect world described by economists. This result, that is close 
but also different from the "Coase theorem", remained ignored by economists and by 
most of legal scholars until the late 1960s, early 1970s. It was only when scholars 
started to emphasize the unrealistic assumptions upon which rest the Coase theorem 
that they also started to pay attention to Calabresi. His works were then mainly used to 
emphasize the limits of the Coase theorem. Calabresi and Coase were put on the same 
footing; the works of the former presented as more complete and more practical than the 
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